Get In Touch

Address Location on map

Lecturers

Home // Lecturers // Abdalla Omran Salem Turki

Abdalla Omran Salem Turki

General Director, Research Center, University of Zintan, Libya


Permanent Lecturer

Qualification: Doctorate

Academic rank: Lecturer

Specialization: اقتصاد تطبيقي - ادارة اعمال

- Faculty of Accounting - Rujban

About Abdalla

Director of Research Center, University of Zintan, 2020- • Spearheaded research initiatives that will hopefully lead to policy reforms in local economic practices. • Working on Secured funding for some major research projects. Deputy Dean, Faculty of Accounting. University of Zintan, 2013-2017 • Emphasized and Implemented measures rules and instructions that improved staff and student engagement considerably. • Led a team of faculty members to lay the grounds that contributes to the recently obtained the quality assuring approval from the ministry of higher education and scientific research Member of National Transitional Council, Chairman of the Economic and Industrial Committee and Member of High election Committee, Libya, 2011-2012 • Contributed to drafting economic policies during a critical transitional period • Contributed to the establishment and the creation of the Libyan High Electoral Commission. Deputy Director of The Libyan Taxation Authority, Tripoli, Libya, 2010-2011 • Developed and established programs and incentives aimed to raise the moral of the authority's employees and enhance their feeling and pride of belonging to it. Expert and Local Consultant, Korea Institute for Development Strategy, Korea-Libya Project, Nov 2009 • Contributions: participate with the members of the and Korea Institute for Development Strategy in the drafting of the report publication titled: Establishment of SME-Oriented TVET System to Support Public Sector Reform and Employment Promotion in Libya, April, 2010 Member of Management Committee, Labor and Vocational Training Authority, Director of Department of Vocational Training and Advisor to the Secretary of Labor and Vocational Training Authority, Tripoli, Libya, Apr, Aug 2009 • Drafted and suggested concise short and medium national vocational training programs aimed at absorbing the unemployed Libyan citizen in the Libyan Labor Market. Deputy Director, Department of Research & Statistics, Deputy Director, Project of Modernization and Development, Central Bank of Libya, 2008-2009 • Established programs to encourage research within the department • Contributed in drafting and shaping the project of the modernization of the Central Bank • As a member of the supreme committee, selected by the General People Committee, I submitted a policy paper on establishing and encouraging the small and medium size enterprises in Libya. And The policy paper was adopted as the national strategic plan for the following five years.

Publications
Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot: A Two Stage Game
Chapter

We consider a differentiated duopoly where firms invest in research and development (R&D) to reduce their production cost. The objective of this study is to derive and compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria, and then examine the robustness of the literature's results, especially those of Qiu (1997). We find that The main results of this study are as follows: (a) Bertrand competition is more efficient if R&D productivity is low, industry spillovers are weak, or products are very different. (b) Cournot competition is more efficient if R&D productivity is high and R&D spillovers and products' degree of substitutability are not very small. (c) Cournot competition may lead to higher Outputs, higher consumer surpluses and lower prices, provided that R&D productivity is very high and spillovers and degree of substitutability of firms' products are moderate to high, (d) Cournot competition results in higher R&D Investments compared to Bertrand's. These results show that the relative efficiencies of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria are sensitive to the suggested specifications, and hence far from being robust.

ResearchGate Logo


Michèle Breton, Abdalla Turki, (12-2005), Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications (pp.161-173): springer,

Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot under Precommitment
Chapter

We consider a differentiated duopoly where firms invest in research and development (R&D) to reduce their production cost. We show that if the firms play a one stage game, i.e., they choose R&D and price (in Bertrand game) or quantity (in Cournot game)at the same time, then the usual result stating that Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition still holds.

Michèle Breton, Abdalla Turki, Georges Zaccour, (01-2005), Game Theory and Applications, 10, 31–38, 2005: springer,

Dynamic Model of R&D, Spillovers, and Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria
Journal Article

Using an infinite-horizon two-player differential game, we derive and compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria for a differentiated duopoly engaging in the process of R&D competition. The main findings of this study are as follows. First, Bertrand competition is more efficient if either R&D productivity is low or products are very different. Second, Cournot competition is more efficient provided that R&D productivity is high, products are close substitutes, and spillovers are not close to zero. This last result is different from what has been obtained in the literature. Hence, this shows that considering a dynamic model and more general investment costs does have an impact on the efficiency results.

M. Breton, . A. Turki, G. Zaccour, (10-2004), Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications: SPRINGER LINK, -1